STANAG KLV Interoperability, Audit Chain & Device Architecture
Objective
Validation of external STANAG/MISB streams, a tamper-evident evidence chain and the new capability-based object model.
STANAG 4609 / MISB KLV
An externally generated MISB ST0601 stream with asynchronous KLV was processed through the UDP ingest path. Timestamps and positions matched two independent parsers.
Result: All KLV packets were processed live, without reset or loss. Invalid KLV, MAVLink or GPS positions are excluded; source changes are marked on the track.
Recording and evidence chain
Each session uses an isolated SHA-256 hash chain. MPEG-TS raw segments remain unchanged; proxies are generated separately. Queue and socket loss and hash deviations appear as gaps or warnings. Session-based retention supports a warning period, legal hold and a persistent deletion record. Derived points of interest remain available without dead media references.
Result: All 20 chains with 1,020 entries remained valid. Abort and resume behaviour in the deletion path was verified with real test data.
Device and object architecture
Drones, cameras and operators now use one object model with optional video, position and control capabilities. Unknown streams are rejected; operating state comes from real data flow. A template-based wizard creates objects with visible source priority and failover.
Validated functions
- External MISB ST0601 ingest
- Session-based hash chain with gap and deletion records
- Capability-based object model with a controlled lifecycle
- Task-independent preflight check
